DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14483/10.14483/udistrital.jour.RC.2015.22.a9Publicado:
10/10/2015Número:
Vol. 22 Núm. 2 (2015): Mayo-Agosto 2015Sección:
ArtículosConstrucción disciplinar del conocimiento científico
Disciplinary construction of scientific knowledge
Palabras clave:
Multidimensionalidad, complejidad, saber científico, disciplinariedad, ciencia, filosofía. (es).Descargas
Resumen (es)
En este artículo se presenta un análisis a la construcción disciplinar del conocimiento desde una perspectiva de la multidimensionalidad y la complejidad. Se hace un estudio de las dimensiones sociales que abarcan los efectos de la investigación científica sobre la vida humana y las relaciones sociales y culturales. En el desarrollo se cubren los aspectos socio-culturales de confianza, verdad y disciplinariedad, y del orden y la racionalidad del conocimiento científico, desde la perspectiva de una ciencia democrática y socio-responsable.
Resumen (en)
This article presents an analysis of the disciplinary construction of knowledge from a perspective of multidimensionality and complexity. A study is made of the social dimensions that encompass the effects of scientific research on human life and social and cultural relations. The socio-cultural aspects of trust, truth, and disciplinarity, and the order and rationality of scientific knowledge are covered in the development, from the perspective of a democratic and socio-responsible science.
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