Construcción disciplinar del conocimiento científico -Disciplinary construction of scientific knowledge

Edgar Serna-Montoya

Resumen


En este artículo se presenta un análisis a la construcción disciplinar del conocimiento desde una perspectiva de la multidimensionalidad y la complejidad. Se hace un estudio de las dimensiones sociales que abarcan los efectos de la investigación científica sobre la vida humana y las relaciones sociales y culturales. En el desarrollo se cubren los aspectos socio-culturales de confianza, verdad y disciplinariedad, y del orden y la racionalidad del conocimiento científico, desde la perspectiva de una ciencia democrática y socio-responsable.

ABSTRACT

This article presents an analysis of the disciplinary construction of knowledge from a perspective of multidimensionality and complexity. A study is made of the social dimensions that encompass the effects of scientific research on human life and social and cultural relations. The socio-cultural aspects of trust, truth and disciplinarity, and the order and rationality of scientific knowledge are covered in the development, from the perspective of a democratic and socio-responsible science.


Palabras clave


Multidimensionalidad; complejidad; saber científico; disciplinariedad; ciencia; filosofía.

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Referencias


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.14483/10.14483/udistrital.jour.RC.2015.22.a9



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